SuperEx Educational Series: The 50 Most Common Blockchain Attack Types (Part 1 · Attacks 19–42)

#Blockchain #Attack

We’ve already written quite a lot of educational articles related to crypto attacks. There is an enormous amount of content in the crypto world that needs to be explained — from basic knowledge points to applied knowledge. In order to better expand the scope of blockchain education for everyone, in the next three articles we will provide a summary-style educational overview of the 50 most common types of blockchain attacks, which also includes attacks we have already covered, such as Sybil attacks, 51% attacks, cross-chain bridge attacks, and more.

Now we begin “SuperEx Educational Series: The 50 Most Common Blockchain Attack Types” — Part Two. This article focuses on a full systemic-risk breakdown across topics including network-layer attacks, cross-chain bridge attacks, oracle manipulation, and MEV-related attacks, among others.

When we talk about blockchain security, people often concentrate their attention on smart contract vulnerabilities or on-chain asset theft incidents. But in reality, blockchain risks go far beyond the code itself. Deeper threats are lurking in the network layer, the data source layer, the cross-chain communication layer, and the transaction ordering layer.

https://news.superex.com/articles/20965.html

Network Layer Attacks: Taking Down a Blockchain by Breaking Its Base Communication (19–23)

Network-layer security is the most overlooked yet most dangerous part of blockchain. At this layer, most attacks do not require breaking cryptography, nor do they require exploiting smart contracts. They can paralyze links or disrupt consensus simply by relying on node-connection logic, bandwidth resources, and network topology.

Below are the most common and most destructive network-layer attacks:

Eclipse Attack

We explained this in previous articles. The main idea is isolating a node so it votes on a “fake world.” The core impact is: a single node or a small set of nodes is completely isolated by the attacker and can only see fake blocks constructed by the attacker.

In an eclipse attack, the attacker does not need to control 51% of hash power. They only need to control enough IP addresses and node connection points to make the target node lose access to the real network view.

Objectives an eclipse attack can achieve include:

making the node vote for invalid blocks
preventing the node from broadcasting transactions
assisting in executing a 51% attack (because the node remains on an old chain)
-Induce block producers to accept the attacker’s transaction ordering
an eclipse attack is a low-cost “weakness amplifier” that can be used to chain together larger on-chain attacks

DDoS Attack: Flooding the Chain Until It Collapses

Some attackers use botnets to violently flood nodes or RPC services with requests, leading to:

block delays
network congestion
inability to sync blocks
nodes being forced offline

Typical victims include Solana, Polygon, and Ethereum L2s. According to statistics, 70% of popular public chains have experienced some form of DDoS attack.

BGP Hijacking

Can you imagine it? Even your network routing can become a security vulnerability. When an attacker hijacks backbone internet routing (the BGP protocol), they can redirect traffic between blockchain nodes to the attacker’s servers.

Severity Max: attackers can eavesdrop on node data transmission, implement region-level eclipse attacks, isolate nodes in a country/region, and cause chain forks. For example: in 2018, Amazon Route 53 was hijacked, leading to MyEtherWallet users’ assets being stolen.

Sybil Attack

Massively disguised identities penetrating the network — this was also mentioned in Part One. But Sybil attacks are a “universal” attack type that spans multiple domains, so we bring it up again.

Attackers create fake nodes, and then:

control network topology
execute eclipse attacks
monopolize block propagation paths
interfere with P2P data synchronization

Sybil attacks are essentially the “foundation layer” of many network-layer attacks.

Time Dilation Attack

This is an attack that makes nodes fall behind while letting the attacker stay ahead. An attacker can manipulate a node’s clock so it accepts outdated blocks, resulting in:

light clients being deceived
liquidity providers suffering arbitrage
invalid chain extensions appearing

The scope is hidden, but it is extremely destructive.

Partition Attack

Attackers split global nodes into two worlds. If an attacker can control global nodes’ network routing, the chain may become an “Eastern Hemisphere chain” and a “Western Hemisphere chain.”

Severe consequences may include:
chain reorganizations
double-spending
some users seeing the wrong chain
especially deadly for PoS chains (slashing normal nodes)

This type of attack used to be considered theoretical only, but in the Ethereum PoS era it has become a real risk.

Cross-chain Bridge Attacks: The Biggest Capital Black Hole in Crypto (24–29)

This should be familiar to everyone — we have a dedicated educational article explaining cross-chain bridge attacks. If you haven’t read it, don’t worry; this time we will explain it again.

Cross-chain bridges caused losses of over $2.6 billion from 2021–2024, and they are currently the most expensive attack type in crypto history. Why are they so frequent? Because bridges are the Web3 world’s simplest, most fragile, and most “fat” target. Once breached, attackers can directly “print money.” Who wouldn’t be tempted?

Cross-chain bridge attack types mainly include:

Multi-sig Compromise

As long as the attacker gets the ticket, they can empty the vault: bridges commonly use multisigs to manage funds. But if multisig private keys are stolen or compromised via social engineering, the entire bridge can be drained instantly.

For example:

Ronin Bridge (5 of 6 multisig keys compromised) lost $625 million
Harmony Horizon Bridge (2-of-5 multisig compromised) lost $100 million

Multisigs are unsafe, and the biggest reason is not technology — it is “human nature.”

Verification Logic Flaw

The bridge trusts the wrong message, and the attacker mints assets directly. The most classic case: Wormhole’s $325 million theft — the attacker exploited a tiny verification BUG, made the bridge trust forged cross-chain messages, and thus “minted” assets out of thin air.

Replay Attack

Reusing an old message to trick the bridge into transferring again. If a bridge does not strictly validate nonce and timestamps, attackers can reuse an existing proof to trick repeated withdrawals. This is also one of the most overlooked risks in cross-chain bridges.

Consensus Spoofing

The attacker forges source-chain state, making the bridge think a transfer is valid. For example, some light-client bridges — if source-chain verification is not strict, they may accept forged blocks and ultimately send assets out incorrectly.

Fork Exploit

Using L1 forks to deceive bridge logic. Attackers often leverage temporary forks, chain reorganizations, or MEV forks to force a “fake state” and bypass cross-chain validators.

Oracle Price Attacks Triggering Cross-chain Bridge Losses

Bridges often rely on oracles to judge value. Once prices are manipulated, low-collateral attacks and underpriced collateral liquidations can cause cross-chain exchange logic to break. You could say oracle manipulation is a major systemic risk for bridge security.

Oracle Manipulation: What Happens When the “Single Truth Point” of On-chain External Data Gets Controlled? (30–35)

Another familiar topic we have learned before — oracle manipulation.

Oracle attacks sit at the core of DeFi collapse risk, because oracles are the on-chain “price source.” If this source is polluted, protocols across the chain, collateral ratios, and liquidation mechanisms all break. Below are the most representative oracle attack methods:

Flash Loan Price Attack

Attackers use flash loans to manipulate the price of a DEX pool in a short time: borrowing large funds, then dumping or pumping within a single pool, causing the oracle to believe the price moved dramatically — triggering liquidation, arbitrage, minting logic, and more — then the attacker withdraws profits. This is the most common attack method in DeFi in recent years.

Low Liquidity Oracle Attack

Attackers choose ultra-low-liquidity pools and manipulate prices with small mount of capital., causing the oracle to read an incorrect value. This often happens with:

small-cap tokens
long-tail assets
weak-liquidity pools
protocols that use DEX prices as oracle sources

Data Source Poisoning

If an oracle depends on only one or two data sources (such as a single exchange), attackers can:

place malicious orders on a centralized exchange
create fake trades
manipulate index prices
make on-chain oracles follow the wrong value

Oracle Latency Attack

Attackers arbitrage the time gap between on-chain oracle updates and real market prices: liquidating before the oracle updates, and exploiting the delay window for price manipulation — triggering on-chain “stale price attacks.” Latency is extremely dangerous in highly volatile markets.

Feed Weight Exploit

Some oracles use weighted averages. If an attacker can control weight allocation, they can make incorrect data influence the final output.

Oracle Collusion Attack

If an oracle uses multiple nodes to submit prices, attackers can bribe part of the nodes to submit wrong prices, affecting the final feed.

MEV & Transaction Ordering Attacks: The Most Hidden but Most Severe “Invisible Tax” On-chain (36–42)

MEV stands for Miner/Maximal Extractable Value. This is the most hidden “gray zone” in the blockchain world. It is not necessarily hacking, but its harm can far exceed many attacks. Below are the most mainstream MEV-type attacks:

Frontrunning

Your transaction gets its profit stolen before it even lands on-chain. Attackers (or miners) see your transaction first, then:

place theirs ahead of yours with higher gas
steal your arbitrage opportunity
buy ahead so you end up buying at a higher price

All public chains are affected.

Sandwich Attack

The attacker wedges in front of and behind you, forcing you to “buy high and sell low.” Sounds magical? Once you understand it, it’s simple. The process:

see the user is about to buy a token
buy first (push the price up)
let the user buy at a higher price
sell after and take profit

Sandwich attacks are the most common MEV method in the DEX ecosystem.

Backrunning

Attackers execute arbitrage immediately after a transaction, such as:

liquidation arbitrage
DEX repricing arbitrage

Its harm is lower than sandwich attacks, but it is still “invisible extraction.”

Time Bandit Attack

Using chain reorganizations to rewrite history and capture MEV directly. PoW chains are most likely to suffer time bandit attacks: attackers roll back blocks and repackage transactions with higher MEV profits to capture massive gains. This is the attack method closest to “blockchain civil war.”

Validator Censorship

Validators censor your transaction. In the PoS era, validators can selectively ignore transactions to pursue higher MEV strategies. For example:

censoring certain addresses
preventing liquidation
prioritizing MEV-bundled transactions

This risk became more realistic after Ethereum moved to PoS.

MEV — JIT Liquidity Attack

Providing liquidity only to harvest users instantly. “Just-in-time liquidity (JIT)” is essentially a form of MEV: attackers add LP right before a large trade, harvest trading fees, then immediately exit. For ordinary LPs, it’s getting “blood-sucked.”

Why Are These Attacks So Dangerous?

These attacks involve:

the network layer: determines whether the chain is usable
cross-chain bridges: the hub of value circulation
oracles: system reference prices
MEV: transaction fairness and user experience

Together they form the underlying structure of the Web3 financial system. If any link is broken, it may trigger a chain reaction.

Below are three systemic-risk perspectives:

Structural Risk: cross-chain bridges and oracles are “centralized weak points,” meaning one point fails and the whole board loses.
Visibility Problem: oracle attacks and MEV attacks are often not noticed by users, but their impact is extremely deep. The losses they cause are often not “stolen,” but “extracted.”
Asymmetric Cost: hacker cost is extremely low but returns are huge, for example:

only a small amount of funds is needed for flash loan attacks
only a small number of nodes is needed for eclipse attacks
only a small number of multisig keys is needed to seize a bridge
asymmetry makes attacks more frequent

SuperEx has always emphasized: On-chain security is not a single-point confrontation, but a system defense engineering project. For the above attack types, a defense system can be built from four directions:

zero-trust cross-chain architecture (ZK Bridge, Light Client Bridge)
multi-layer oracle redundancy systems (multi-source feeds + decentralized nodes)
network-layer attack resistance technology (PeerGuard, randomized node discovery)
MEV mitigation mechanisms (protected transaction pools, encrypted mempools)

These systems together form a complete security framework.

Closing: Blockchain Is Not Invincible — Security Is a Continuous War

Security problems in the blockchain industry are not accidental events, but systemic challenges. Cross-chain bridges, oracles, and network-layer attacks expose Web3’s fragility, and they also drive the industry to continuously innovate security architectures.